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STATUTES AND STANDARDS: 
HAS THE DOOR TO EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE 
BEEN OPENED? 
Todd A. DeMitchell* 
Terri A. DeMitchell** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments . . . In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he [or she] is denied the 
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms. 
Brown v. Board of Education1 
If doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers and other 
professionals are charged with a duty owing to the 
public whom they serve, it could not be said that 
nothing in the law precludes similar treatment of 
professional educators. 
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District2 
The United States Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board of 
Education, captures the importance of education as a primary 
* Professor and Chair, Department of Education, University of New 
Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire. B.A., La Verne College; M.A.T., University of 
La Verne; M.A., University of California, Davis; Ed.D., University of Southern 
California; Post-Doctorate, Harvard University. 
** Former teacher, university instructor, and school law attorney (Law Offices of 
Biddle & Hamilton, Sacramento, California). B.A., San Diego State University; J.D., 
University of San Diego; M.A., University of California, Davis; M.Ed., Harvard 
University. 
L 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
2. 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353 (1979). 
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value to individuals and society. Consequently, dialogue and 
debate about the goals of education are a "potent means of 
defining the present and shaping the future." 3 It is "one way 
that Americans make sense of their lives."4 A debate of how 
best to reform education is reshaping the landscape of public 
education. The thrust of many reform strategies is the public's 
desire to hold public schools accountable for the education of 
society's youth. "The formulation of standards and the 
measurement of performance [are] intended to tidy up a messy 
system and to make teachers and school administrators truly 
accountable."5 Nearly all states have instituted some form of 
an accountability mechanism. "The emergence of state-level, 
performance-based accountability systems is a predictable 
consequence of the standards and assessment movements in 
education."6 W. James Popham, a recognized testing expert 
from UCLA, describes the installation of state-mandated 
testing as educational accountability's key feature. 7 In his 
opinion, the purpose of this testing was clear: legislators did 
not believe that public school educators were doing their jobs 
effectively. After hearing a litany of school failures, the 
citizenry was doubtful that its tax dollars were being well spent 
on the schools.s 
Although accountability is pervasive, it remams a 
conundrum for public education. Policy makers want to be 
seen as supporting accountability and high standards for 
students and educators. 9 Accountability m education 
3. David Tyack & Larry Cuban, Tinkering Toward Utopia: A Century of Public 
School Reform 42 (Harvard U. Press 1995). 
4. Id. 
5. Elliot W. Eisner, What Does It Mean to Say a School Is Doing Well?, 82 Phi 
Delta Kappan 367 (200 1). 
6. Casey D. Cobb, Performance-Based Accountability Systems for Public 
Education 4 (N.H. Ctr. for Pub. Policy Studies Feb. 21, 2002). In addition, federal law, 
No Child Left Behind, requires that schools notifY students if the school is labeled as 
failing so that the students may choose to attend another schooL 
7. For a discussion of the purposes, benefits, and arguments of high stakes 
testing, see Assessment-High Stakes/Competency Testing <www.ecs.org/htmllissue 
.asp>. 
8. W. James Popham, Modern Educational Measurement: Practical Guidelines 
for Educational Leaders (Paul A. Smith, 3d ed., Allyn & Bacon 2000). 
9. "The United States is in the midst of a movement to use standards as the 
rallying principle for the improvement of academic achievement in the schools." Marc 
S. Tucker & Judy B. Codding, Standards For Our Schools: How to Set Them, Measure 
Them, and Reach Them, 40-41 (Josey-Bass Publishers 1998). 
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increasingly requires that if a prescribed standard is not met 
then a consequence must follow. For example, if the student 
does not measure up according to a high-stakes test, then fail 
the student without allowing social promotions. 10 If the school 
is labeled as failing, allow the students to transfer to another 
school, 11 fire the principal, or reconstitute/restructure the 
school. 12 If the school district is failing, place it into 
receivership. If students and schools are being held 
accountable, can accountability requirements for educators be 
far behind?13 
When standards are formulated for teaching and learning, 
expectations for practice are articulated. Professionals, such as 
physicians and attorneys, are held individually accountable 
through malpractice suits when their professional actions fail 
to conform to accepted practices and an injury results. 14 To 
date, malpractice in education has failed as a theory of 
recovery. 15 Currently, unlike other professionals, educators are 
10. For a discussion of high-stakes testing and due process, see William P. 
Quigley, Due Process Rights of Grade School Students Subjected to High-Stakes 
Testing, 10 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 284 (2001). 
11. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), in which students from 
low-income families are allowed to leave the public school for a private school and to 
have their choice supported through public funds. 
12. See No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 15 Stat. 1425 (2002), 
which lists consequences for failure to make "yearly adequate progress." See also 
<www.ed.gov/News/Letters/020724.html> (accessed Dec. 26, 2002). 
13. See Rebecca R. Glasgow, Student Author, Can Students Sue When Schools 
Don't Make the Grade? The Washington Assessment of Student Learning and 
Educational Malpractice, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 893, 924 (2001) (Students who fail the 
Washington Assessment of Student Learning test but have met all graduation 
requirements should be able to bring a private cause of action for educational 
malpractice. "The [Academic Achievement and Accountability] Statute expresses a 
clear school district duty to individual students while insisting on school 
accountability."). 
14. See Michael J. Polelle, Who's on First, and What's a Professional, 33 U.S.F. L. 
Rev. 205, 206 (1999). ("Judicial intervention in the specific professions of medicine and 
law has largely molded the malpractice law applied to all professionals."). 
15. See Ross v. Creighton U., 740 F.Supp. 1319, 1327 (N.D. Ill. 1990) 
("Educational malpractice is a tort theory beloved of commentators, but not of courts."); 
Livosi v. Hicksville Union-Free Sch. Dist., 693 N.Y.S.2d 617, 617-618 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 
1999) ("As a matter of public policy, such a cause of action cannot be entertained by 
courts of this State."); and Brown v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171, 
172 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1998) ("Policy considerations preclude 'an actionable 'duty of 
care' in persons and agencies who administer the academic phases of the public 
educational process"' (citing Peter W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 
(Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1976)). See further Karen H. Calavenna, Student Author, 
Educational Malpractice, 64 U. Det. L. Rev. 717 (1987); Frank Aquila, Educational 
Malpractice: A Tort En Ventre, 38 Clev. St. L. Rev. 323 (1991); Alice J. Klein, Student 
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not required to perform their duties in accordance with the 
standard of care observed by their profession. 16 Administrative 
action can be taken resulting in an educator being disciplined, 
even dismissed, for incompetence. But a student who is injured 
due to an inadequate education has no legal recourse in a suit 
for damagesY However, a change may be occurring in which 
educators may be held liable for the performance of their 
professional activities. Standards have been set for students 
and for curriculum. Currently, standards are being developed 
by the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards for 
research, interstate compacts, and teaching.l8 It is time to 
revisit the issue of educational malpractice in light of systemic 
reform efforts and attendant drive for accountability. 
While holding schools and educators accountable through 
standards and testing is pervasive, another educational policy 
movement with instructional implications may be gaining 
momentum nationally. In California, Arizona, Colorado, and 
Massachusetts, ballot initiatives designed to radically change 
bilingual education were placed before voters. 19 Colorado was 
the only state to reject the proposals. 20 The three enacted 
initiatives have similar teacher liability provisions in which 
teachers can be sued. And, in Arizona and Massachusetts, 
Author, Educational Malpractice: Can the Judiciary Remedy the Growing Problem of 
Functional Illiteracy, 13 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 27 (1979); Martha M. McCarthy, Nelda H. 
Cambron-McCabe, & Stephen B. Thomas, Public School Law: Teachers' and Students' 
Rights 102 (Ray Short, 4th ed., Allyn & Bacon 1998) ("no educational malpractice claim 
has yet been successfuf') and Patricia Abbott, Student Author, Sain v. Cedar Rapids 
Community School District: Providing Special Protection for Student-Athletes, 2002 
BYU Educ. & L.J. 291 ("Long ago, legal scholars held a funeral service for the tort of 
educational malpractice."). 
16. For example, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2002), paragraph 4, 
states in part, "In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt, and 
diligent." And Rule 1.1 of the same document states competence requires a lawyer to 
employ and maintain "the requisite knowledge and skill." (available at 
<www .abanet.org/cpr/mrpc> (last accessed Sept. 28, 2002). 
17. Michael Smoker, Results: The Key to Continuous School Improvement, 8 (2d 
ed., Assn. for Supervision & Curriculum Dev. 1999) ("A report on education and the 
economy indicates that 'educational attainment is the single most important 
determinant of a person's success in the labor market ... .In the 50 years it has been 
tracked, the payoff to schooling has never been higher."'). 
18. For information on the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, 
visit www.nbpts.org. 
19. Mary Ann Zehr, Voters Courted in Two States on Bilingual Education, Educ. 
Week 1, 22 (Sept. 11, 2002). 
20. Mary Ann Zehr, Colo. Extends Bilingual Ed., But Mass. Voters Reject It, Educ. 
Week 22, 23 (Nov. 13, 2002). 
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teachers can lose their jobs if they fail in carrying out the 
provisions of the acts. The confluence of two streams, statutory 
liability involving instructional practices and emerging 
standards of teaching practice, may now result in the viability 
of a tort action for educational malpractice. 
This discussion is divided into three parts. First, 
professional malpractice will be discussed with a focus on 
negligence, the legal theory upon which malpractice is 
grounded. Malpractice in medicine, law, and education will also 
be examined. Secondly, California Teachers Association v. 
State Board of Education, which challenged the 
implementation of California Proposition 277, English 
Language in Public Schools will be examined. 21 Finally, 
attempts to draw a conclusion about the future of educational 
malpractice litigation will be made. 
II. PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE 
Professionals who engage m alleged professional 
misconduct or allegedly lack appropriate skill resulting in 
injury may be liable for malpractice. Malpractice is often 
distinguished from other wrongs committed by professionals in 
that it deals with the quality of the services rendered. 22 
Professionals are held accountable through malpractice "for 
failure to perform in accordance with the skills that define 
their jobs."23 They are expected to utilize a standard of care 
recognized by their profession as appropriate based on the 
training received and the commonly held set of practices 
associated with the service rendered. 24 
Failure to exercise the accepted standard of care may form 
the basis for malpractice if the negligent delivery of the service 
is legal cause for an injury suffered due to the lack of an 
appropriate standard of care. In medicine, a surgeon may 
21. 271 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2001); Cal. Educ. Code Ann.§ 310 et seq. (West 2002). 
22. Ronald E. Mallen, Recognizing and Defining Legal Malpractice, 30 S.C. L. 
Rev. 203, 204-05 (1979). 
23. John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating Educational Malpractice Claims: A 
Representational Focus, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 349, 371 (1992). 
24. For example, a physician owes a patient: (I) [the] duty to possess the requisite 
knowledge and skill such as is possessed by the average member of the medical 
profession; (2) [the] duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the application of 
such knowledge and skill; and (3) [the] duty to use best judgment in such application. 
See 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians and Surgeons§ 311 (1981). 
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operate on a patient and follow all of the commonly accepted 
procedures for the operation and the patient may die. The 
death of the patient is not the measure of malpractice; the 
delivery of the standard of care concerning the operation is the 
dispositive factor. In other words, a malpractice suit will not 
prevail if the patient dies despite the surgeon doing everything 
expected in the delivery of the professional service. Similarly, 
in legal malpractice, lawyers may not be responsible for honest 
errors of judgment.25 
The success of such a suit depends on several factors. 
Generally, the key to such malpractice cases is whether the 
professional performed in accordance with the standard of care 
observed by members of the profession. 26 In other words, the 
standard of care is used to measure the competence of the 
professional. Malpractice is defined as 
[p]rofessional misconduct or unreasonable lack of skill. 
Doctors, lawyers, and accountants usually apply the 
term to such conduct. [It is the] failure of one rendering 
professional services to exercise the degree of skill and 
learning commonly applied under all the circumstances 
of the community by the average prudent reputable 
member of the profession with the result of injury, loss 
or damage to the recipient of those services or to those 
entitled to rely upon them. It is any professional 
misconduct, unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in 
professional or fiduciary duties, evil practice, or illegal 
or immoral conduct.27 
Malpractice actions may be brought under tort law or 
contract law. The trend, however, is to bring such actions 
under the former. With some exceptions, this is true even if 
the relationship between the plaintiff and the professional is 
established by a contract. 
A tort is a civil wrong based on reasonableness and fault. 
Under tort law, an individual who has suffered because of the 
improper conduct of another may sue that person for money 
25. Mark Richard Cummsford, Resolving Fee Disputes and Legal Malpractice 
Claims Using ADR, 85 Marq. L. Rev. 975, 978 (2002). 
26. See Hall v. Hilburn, 466 S.2d 856 (Miss. 1985) for a discussion of the 
parameters of the medical standard. 
27. Black's Law Dictionary 864 (1979). See also Bd. of Examiners of Veterinary 
Med. v. Mohr, 485 P.2d 235, 239 (Okla. 1971) ("any professional misconduct or any 
unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in the performance of professional or fiduciary 
duties; ... objectionable, or wrong practice; ... practice contrary to rules."). 
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damages. The purpose of tort law is to balance a plaintiffs 
claim of damages due to suffered harm against a defendant's 
freedom of action. Often, the potential social consequences of a 
particular judicial determination will be examined when 
deciding a case. Thus, in tort litigation, it is possible that even 
if it is appropriate to provide compensation to a specific 
plaintiff, the plaintiff will be denied compensation if it is 
determined that there may be negative social consequences 
associated with such a decision. Such social consequences are 
often referred to as public policy concerns. As will be 
discussed, public policy concerns play a significant and 
sometimes conflicting role in malpractice litigation. 
A. Negligence 
Tort actions regarding malpractice are brought under the 
theory of negligence if the acts of the professional that 
allegedly inflicted harm were not intended to cause harm. If 
the professional intended the allegedly harmful conduct, the 
malpractice action is brought under a theory of intentional 
torts. Since most harmful acts by professionals are 
unintentional, the most common theory asserted against a 
professional for malpractice is negligence. Therefore, this 
discussion will only address negligence claims. 
To successfully bring an action under the theory of 
negligence, the following elements must be present: 
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, 
requiring the individual to conform to a certain 
standard of conduct for the protection of others against 
unreasonable risks. 
2. A failure on the individual's part to conform to the 
standard required constituting a breach of the duty. 
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the 
conduct and the resulting injury. This is what is 
commonly known as "legal cause" or "proximate cause," 
and includes the notion of cause in fact (but for). 
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of 
another.28 
28. W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, & David G. Owen, Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th ed., West 1984). 
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To clearly understand the reasons why educators are not 
subject to malpractice suits while other professionals are, 
examples of judicial determinations for both physicians and 
attorneys will be reviewed, highlighting legal and policy issues. 
1. Duty Owed 
The first element required in any negligence case is the 
existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the complaining 
party. Whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff is a 
question of whether the defendant is under a legal obligation to 
act or not to act for the benefit of the plaintiff. The courts 
readily recognize such a duty between a physician and patient 
for policy reasons. Patients often stake their lives on the fact 
that they will receive competent care when they seek medical 
assistance. This duty applies to all aspects of the relationship 
from diagnosis to treatment. 
If a duty is owed, then the professional is required to 
conform to the legal standard of care or conduct related to that 
duty. Generally, the reasonable person standard applies, but if 
the defendant renders services in a recognized trade or 
profession, he or she is held at a minimum to the standard of 
care customarily exercised by members of that profession or 
trade, whether he or she actually possesses the requisite skills. 
If the professional does in fact have a higher degree of skill 
than that customarily possessed by other professionals in the 
same field, the professional is held to the standard of care that 
a reasonable person with superior know ledge or skill would 
exercise. Thus, the professionals are held to a higher standard 
than others engaged in the same profession. 
A duty of care will arise between a physician and a patient 
if there is a contract for professional services. Therefore, if a 
physician and patient agree that in exchange for a fee, the 
physician will treat the patient, an express contract is created. 
In most instances, however, a physician and patient do not 
enter into such an agreement. Instead, a patient simply enters 
the physician's office and receives treatment. Under these 
circumstances, the courts recognize that an implied contract is 
created if a physician treats a patient with the expectation of 
compensation. This is true regardless of who pays for the 
treatment.29 
29. Id. 
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Statutes may also create a duty.3° For example, some 
states have required that hospitals with emergency facilities 
render emergency care.31 Even without express statutes, some 
courts have found that licensing statutes and health 
regulations require that emergency care facilities treat 
emergency patients, thus creating a duty. 32 While compliance 
with a statute may be used as evidence that the defendant used 
due care, it may be alleged that the defendant was negligent 
because he or she did not do more than required by statute.33 
Furthermore, physicians can be held liable under the 
theory of vicarious liability for the negligent acts of their 
employees if the acts occurred within the scope of 
employment.34 Therefore, if a nurse negligently injures a 
patient while giving the patient an injection, the physician can 
be held liable. 
Physicians are obligated to provide a standard of care to 
their patients typically based on professional norms. 35 The 
standard of care or the duty owed by the physician to the 
patient is grounded in the customary practices of the medical 
profession. The customary practice is normally described as 
the customary practice in the same community, or one 
similar. 36 The standard, however, is not unitary or monolithic. 
There is a respectable minority rule that "serves as an 
accommodation for the exercise of clinical judgment."37 
Regarding this rule, a Pennsylvania court stated, "Where 
competent medical authority is divided, a physician will not be 
30. However, in Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974), the court found that 
compliance with a statute did not exculpate the defendant. In this case, an 
ophthalmologist did not regularly screen patients who were under forty for glaucoma 
since professional standards at the time did not require screening at that age. The 
defendant, who was treated by the physician and under forty, contracted glaucoma 
resulting in visual impairment. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover holding that 
the ease and safety of the pressure test, coupled with the seriousness of the disease, 
made it negligent not to administer the test. 
31. Cal. Health & S. C. Ann.§ 1317 (West 2002). 
32. Guerrero v. Cooper Queen Hosp., 537 P.2d 1329 (Ariz. 1975). 
33. See e.g. Christou v. Arlington Park-Wash. Race Track Corp., 432 N.E.2d 920 
(Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1982). 
34. Prosser, supra n. 28. 
35. James F. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well is It Doing in 
Assuring Quality, Accounting for Costs, and Coping With an Evolving Reality In the 
Health Care Marketplace?, 11 Ann. Health L. 125, 130 (2002). 
36. Id. at 131 (citing Allen H. McClold, The Care Required of Medical 
Practitioners, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 549 (1959)). 
37. Id. at 133. 
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held responsible if in the exercise of his judgment he followed a 
course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of 
recognized and respected professionals in his given area of 
expertise."38 The respectable minority rule does not encompass 
idiosyncratic behavior but it does provide room for competing 
views within a scientifically-based profession. Within the gold 
standard of professional practice exists acceptable multiple 
approaches for meeting the duty owed. 
The courts readily find that attorneys, like physicians, have 
a duty to render competent professional services. In the case of 
attorneys, this duty primarily arises due to a contract for 
services. The most significant errors alleged in legal 
malpractice involve conflicts of interest.39 Usually, based on an 
implied contract, an attorney will render services with the 
expectation of payment without an express agreement. 
Occasionally, an attorney will enter into an express contract 
concerning fees. Such a contract usually does not expressly 
provide that particular services will be rendered or particular 
results obtained. However, despite the expressed contract only 
concerning fees, an implied duty is still created that the 
attorney will exercise the skill and care ordinarily exercised by 
attorneys in performance of contractual obligations.40 
An attorney who represents and advises a client impliedly 
creates a duty that the attorney possesses the necessary skill to 
handle the matters that may result.41 Failure to possess the 
necessary skills or knowledge or to exercise the standard of 
care will result in liability. 42 For example, in Smith v. Lewis, 
an attorney who did not specialize in the area of family law 
represented a woman in a divorce case. Before advising her of 
her rights, the defendant attorney failed to research the issue 
of the community property nature of her husband's military 
pension. The courts found this omission to be malpractice.43 
Certain actions are also considered on their face to lack 
reasonable care, such as missing a timeline which results in 
38. Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 969 (Pa. 1992). 
39. Susan Saab Fortney & Jett Hanna, Legal Malpractice and Professional 
Responsibility: Fortifying a Law Firm's Ethical Infrastructure: Avoiding Legal 
Malpractice Claims Based on Conflicts of Interest, 33 St. Mary's L.J. 669, 671 (2002). 
40. Basic Food Indus. Inc. v. Grant, 310 N.W.2d 26 (Mich. App. 1981). 
41. Citizens' Loan Fund & Saving Assn. v. Friedley, 23 N.E. 1075 (Ind. 1890). 
42. See e.g. Campbell v. Magana, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Cal. App. 1960); George v. 
Caton, 600 P.2d 822 (N.M. App. 1979). 
43. 531 P.2d 589 (Idaho 1974). 
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the loss of a claim44 or settling a case contrary to the express 
instructions of the client.45 They are therefore breaches of duty. 
The above examples illustrate that courts readily find a 
duty of care has arisen when the case involves professionals 
such as physicians and lawyers. Similarly, courts have found 
that educators owe a duty to their students. 46 
Students are compelled to attend school. This compulsion 
helps to form the common law duty as well as statutory duty, 
supported by case law, to anticipate foreseeable dangers and 
take necessary precautions to protect students. Educators owe 
students a duty to "exercise such care of them as a parent of 
ordinary prudence would observe in comparable circumstances. 
The duty owed derives from the simple fact that a school, in 
assuming physical custody and control over its students, 
effectively takes the place of parents and guardians."47 And, 
mandatory schooling forces parents to rely on schools to protect 
their children during school activities. 48 For example, a school 
was sued for negligence when a fourteen-year-old student fell 
while climbing a balcony so that he could jump from it into the 
swimming pool. The Texas court of appeals concluded, "a 
school has the duty to reasonably care for the well-being and 
safety of its students."49 
In the 1976 landmark case, Peter W. v. San Francisco 
Unified School District, the issue of educational malpractice 
was first adjudicated and the stage was set for all subsequent 
educational malpractice actions when recovery was denied. 50 
In this case, a high school graduate brought suit against the 
school district, the superintendent, and the governing board to 
recover for alleged negligence in instruction and intentional 
misrepresentation of the student's progress. The plaintiff 
44. Cotton v. Travaline, 432 A.2d 122 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1981). 
45. Rogers v. Robson, 407 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. 1980). 
46. For example see Todd A. DeMitchell, Education Law Into Practice: The 
Educator and Tort Liability: An Inservice Outline of a Duty Owed, 154 Educ. L. Rep. 
417 (2001). 
47. See e.g. Mirand v. N.Y.C., 614 N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) 
(citation omitted). For a discussion of in loco parentis see Todd A. DeMitchell, The Duty 
to Protect: Blackstone's Doctrine of In Loco Parentis: A Lens for Viewing the Sexual 
Abuse of Students, 2002 BYU Educ. & L..J. 17. 
48. Wyke v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560 (11th Cir. 1997). In New 
Hampshire, public school students are legally entitled to a safe and healthy 
educational environment. See State v. Jacob Drake, 662 A.2d 265 (N.H. 1995). 
49. U. Prep. Sch. v. Huitt, 941 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex. App. 1996). 
50. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814 (Cal. App. 1976). 
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claimed that these actions resulted in the deprivation of basic 
academic skills. In other words, he asserted that he had not 
been adequately educated. 
The plaintiff was an eighteen-year-old male who had 
recently graduated after having been enrolled in the school 
district for approximately twelve years. He claimed that, 
although he had graduated from high school, he possessed only 
a fifth grade reading ability. 
The plaintiff alleged in part that the four requisite elements 
for bringing an action in tort were present in his case. In his 
complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the school district 
(including agents and employees) had a duty to provide him 
with an adequate education and that the school district 
breached that duty. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the 
breach was in fact the proximate cause of his inability to read 
at grade level, therefore injuring him. 
At the outset, the court's opinion acknowledged that the 
parties did not debate the adequacy of the plaintiffs claim with 
respect to negligent acts, proximate cause, and injury, 
therefore clearly recognizing most of the required elements in a 
tort suit. The court, however, had very serious reservations 
regarding the elements of standard of care, causation and 
injury that resulted in a determination that educators owed no 
duty of care to students despite the fact that such a duty is 
readily recognized in suits against other professionals. 
The plaintiff offered three theories to support his contention 
that a duty of care existed: 1) an assumption of the function of 
instruction of students imposes the duty to exercise reasonable 
care in its discharge; 2) a special relationship between students 
and teachers that supports the teachers' duty to exercise 
reasonable care; and 3) the duty of teachers to exercise 
reasonable care in instruction and supervision of students in 
California as set forth in judicial decisions. 
The court admitted the facts impose upon the defendant a 
duty of care within the common meaning of the term. 
However, the court also dismissed each of the theories raised 
by the plaintiff for want of relevant authority establishing that 
the enrollment of the plaintiff in defendants' schools creates a 
legal duty which will sustain liability for negligence of its 
breach. The court did acknowledge that the concept of a duty 
of care as currently recognized is not immutable, but cautioned 
that certain principles must be considered controlling. The 
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most pertinent principle expounded by the court for purposes of 
this issue was that "judicial recognition of such duty in the 
defendant, with the consequence of his liability in negligence 
for its breach, is initially to be dictated or precluded by 
considerations of public policy."51 
Despite the constraints placed on expanding the concept of 
duty, the court acknowledged that the California Supreme 
Court has opened or sanctioned new areas of tort liability when 
the wrongs and the injuries involved were both comprehensible 
and assessable within the existing legal framework. However, 
the court in Peter W. was unwilling to extend the concept of a 
duty of due care to the facts presented in this case due to a 
belief that there is no recognizable standard of care, cause, or 
injury in education: 
Unlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, 
classroom methodology affords no readily acceptable 
standards of care, or cause, or injury. The science of 
pedagogy itself is fraught with different and conflicting 
theories of how or what a child should be taught, and 
any layman might-and commonly does-have his own 
emphatic views on the subject. The 'injury' claimed here 
is plaintiffs inability to read and write. Substantial 
professional authority attests that the achievement of 
literacy in the schools, or its failure, are influenced by a 
host of factors which affect the pupil subjectively, from 
outside the formal teaching process, and beyond the 
control of its ministers. They may be physical, 
neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they 
may be present but not perceived, recognized but not 
identified. 52 
Based on the above reasoning, the court found that a duty 
of due care should not be created because of the multiple 
factors involved in education and because of an assumption on 
the part of the court that there is no recognized methodology 
with regard to education. However, the court expressed other 
concerns that help explain its reluctance to allow a cause of 
action for educational malpractice that extended beyond the 
four elements required for a negligence case. In closing its 
opinion the court explained: 
To hold them to an actionable 'duty of care,' in the 
51. ld. at 822. 
52. ld. at 824. 
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discharge of their academic functions, would expose 
them to the tort claims-real or imagined-of disaffected 
students and parents in countless numbers. They are 
already beset by social and financial problems which 
have gone to major litigation, but for which no 
permanent solution has yet appeared. The ultimate 
consequences, in terms of public time and money, would 
burden them-and society-beyond calculation. Upon 
consideration of the role imposed upon the public 
schools by law and the limitations imposed upon them 
by their publicly supported budgets, and of the just-cited 
'consequences to the community of imposing [upon 
them] a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for 
breach,' we find no such 'duty' in . . . plaintiffs 
complaint.53 
Thus, the plaintiffs action failed because the court refused 
to find that a California school district owed a duty of care 
while instructing students. According to California law, 
educators must adequately supervise students, but according to 
Peter W. they do not have a duty to adequately educate them. 54 
Three years after the case of Peter W. was heard in 
California, a similar action was brought by a high school 
student in New York. In Donohue v. Copiague Union Free 
School District, the plaintiff alleged that he had attended 
Copiague Senior High School from 1972 to 1976 and graduated 
without the rudimentary ability to read and write. 55 The 
plaintiff sought five million dollars in damages. 
The first of two causes of action asserted by the plaintiff 
was educational malpractice while the second was the 
negligent breach of a constitutionally imposed duty to educate 
under New York law. The court rejected the second claim with 
very little discussion but the educational malpractice allegation 
was analyzed in depth. The court found that such a cause of 
action was indeed plausible and stated that "the imagination 
need not be overly taxed to envision allegations of a legal duty 
of care flowing from educators .... "56 
However, after making that determination, the court opined 
that such claims should not be entertained for public policy 
53. Id. at 825. 
54. Cal. Educ. Code Ann. § 44807 (West 2002). 
55. 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979) 
56. Id. at 1353. 
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reasons. The court found the control and management of 
educational affairs in the state of New York was vested in the 
Board of Regents and the Commissioner of Education and that 
courts should not interfere with the decision making of that 
entity absent a gross violation of public policy. The court did 
not elaborate on what type of violation might be considered 
gross, but clearly a lack of due care while instructing students 
was not considered a gross violation of public policy. 
Specifically, the court held that 
[t]o entertain a cause of action for "educational 
malpractice" would require the courts not merely to 
make judgments as to the validity of broad educational 
policies, -a course we have unalteringly eschewed in 
the past-but, more importantly, to sit in review of the 
day-to-day implementation of these policies. 
Recognition in the courts of this cause of action would 
constitute blatant interference with the responsibility 
for the administration of the public school system lodged 
by Constitution and statute in school administrative 
agencies. 57 
Whereas the court in Peter W. found that no duty exists in 
the educational setting and therefore an action in malpractice 
is not possible, the Donohue court found that the four elements 
of a tort do exist in educational malpractice cases. However, 
the court in Donohue chose to insulate educators from liability 
as a matter of public policy by deferring to the judgment of the 
professionals. Interestingly, in medical and legal malpractice 
cases, the courts defer to the profession only to establish a 
standard of care, not to insulate the professionals from 
accountability. Thus, the courts believe that educators should 
not be held accountable for the services they render for both 
legal and policy reasons. 
2. Breach of Duty 
Mere dissatisfaction with the services rendered, however, is 
not enough for a successful claim against a professional, even if 
a duty is established. There must be a breach of the duty of 
care involving the establishment of the degree of care owed and 
proof that the defendant did not meet the requisite standard. 
57. Id. at 1354 (citations omitted). 
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The degree of care owed by the professional must be 
established at trial. Proof of the requisite standard of care is 
generally determined by the testimony of expert witnesses 
knowledgeable about established and acceptable standards 
and, in the case of a physician, knowledgeable about the 
medical condition in question. 58 This is true unless the 
requisite level of care is apparent to a lay juror. The standard 
of care for physicians is defined very generally since the courts 
recognize that medicine is not a precise science. Therefore, 
critically analyzing the facts of each situation becomes the focal 
point in litigation. 
For physicians, the standard of care that is owed to a 
patient can be established by state statute or by professional 
standards. Whether a violation of a standard conclusively 
establishes a breach of the standard of care is open to debate. 
In determining whether a physician has breached the requisite 
standard of care, several factors are examined. These factors 
include the state of professional knowledge at the time of the 
act, the omission by the physician, and established modes of 
practice. The professional knowledge requirement recognizes 
that medical service is a progressive science and therefore, 
treatment rendered must be evaluated in light of the 
knowledge at the time in question. In addition, physicians are 
not held liable for mistakes in judgment where the proper 
action is open to debate.59 
Conversely, no standard of care has been found in 
education. In Peter W., the court stated that classroom 
methodology affords no acceptable standard of care. To support 
its findings, the court pointed to conflicting theories regarding 
how and what to teach students, but did not cite references for 
its conclusions. The court also did not acknowledge the 
"respectable minority" rule used in medical malpractice to 
account for differing practices and professional judgments. 
In Hoffman v. Board of Education, a case involving a 
special education student, similar concerns were expressed 
regarding the lack of a standard of care.60 In this case, the 
court voiced concern that whenever a student failed to 
progress, it could be argued that he or she would have 
58. Swanson v. Chatterton, 160 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. 1968). 
59. See Creasey v. Hogan, 637 P.2d 114 (Or. 1981); Becker v. Hidalgo, 556 P.2d 35 
(N.M. 1976). 
60. 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979). 
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progressed if another form of instruction or assessment had 
been used. 
Contrary conclusions have been reached, however. In 
Donohue, even though the court found that no duty of care 
exists, the court declared that it did not think that the creation 
of a standard of care with which an educator's performance 
could be measured would present an insurmountable obstacle. 
In addition, a dissenting opinion in Hunter v. Board of 
Education, though not binding, concluded that since educators 
receive special training and are state certified, they possess 
special skills and knowledge and should use customary care.61 
Therefore, due to conflicting viewpoints, it is possible that a 
court could find that a standard of care exists in education that 
could be breached. Clearly, violations of standards of practice 
are routinely established in cases involving incompetency. It 
can be reasonably argued that the processes and procedures 
used to determine incompetency could be applied in some 
fashion to ascertain if there has been a breach of the duty to 
adequately educate. 
3. Causation 
Proof that a duty of care exists, coupled with a showing that 
the defendant breached that duty, does not necessarily mean a 
plaintiff will recover. The plaintiff must prove he or she was 
injured and the injury sustained was actually and proximately 
caused by the defendant's negligence. 
A physician cannot be held liable, even if negligent, if the 
negligent actions did not cause the injury plaintiff claims to 
have suffered. For example, a physician who negligently 
prescribed a decongestant for a patient with heart disease 
could not be held liable for the patient's subsequent heart 
attack without proof the medication contributed to the patient's 
death.62 Furthermore, the defendant's negligence must be the 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. In other words, the 
injury must be a foreseeable result of the physician's action or 
inaction or it must be proven that but for the fact that the 
physician prescribed the decongestant, the patient would not 
have died. 
61. 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982). 
62. Fall u. White, 449 N.E.2d 635 (Ind.App. 1983). 
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With respect to attorneys, the issues of causation and 
ascertaining damages can be complicated and often these 
issues are intertwined. One of the most common claims 
against an attorney is the failure to comply with time 
requirements. Such an error on the part of an attorney can 
result in the loss of the legal action by the plaintiff, thus 
precipitating a legal malpractice claim against the tardy 
attorney. While such an error as failing to file an action within 
the time limitations seemingly should be considered 
malpractice, it may not be. The requisite element of causation 
must be present. Therefore, it must first be determined that 
but for the attorney's negligent actions, the plaintiff would not 
have been injured. The plaintiff must then show injury. 
For example, in such a case as the failure to comply with 
timelines, the plaintiff must prove that had the case moved 
forward, he or she would have been successful on the merits. 
In other words, the original case must be considered in full and 
it must be found that the plaintiff would have been successful 
before the plaintiff can be considered damaged. 63 This aspect of 
determining causation and damages is called a trial within a 
trial. The justification is that, in order to truly know what a 
client lost, the original case must be tried in full. 
Establishing causation has also been a major stumbling 
block in education cases. In Peter W., the court stated that 
because the achievement or failure of a student in literacy 
development is influenced by numerous factors beyond the 
education received, causation is difficult to establish. The 
influencing factors include physical, neurological, emotional, 
cultural, and environmental factors. The Donohue court 
supplemented this list with the following additional factors: 
student attitude, motivation, temperament, past experiences, 
and home environment. 
However, the court in Donohue acknowledged that while 
proving causation might be difficult and sometimes impossible, 
it assumes too much to conclude that causation could never be 
established. A dissenting opinion in Hoffman concluded that 
the failure by school officials to follow a recommendation for 
reevaluation of the plaintiff that resulted in his misplacement 
into a CRMD class ("Class of Children of Retarded Mental 
63. See Pete v. Henderson, 269 P.2d 78 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1954); Pusey u. Reid, 
258 A.2d 460 (Del. Super. 1969). 
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Development") was readily identifiable as the proximate cause 
of the plaintiffs injury. Again, the courts do not rule out the 
possibility of establishing causation in educational malpractice 
cases. 
4. Injury 
Even if the elements of negligence are established at trial, 
it will not ensure compensation for the defendant. The plaintiff 
must have actually suffered an injury as a result of the 
negligent act. Therefore, even a physician who commits a 
negligent act will not be held liable if the patient is not injured. 
For example, the courts have refused to award damages to 
women who seek abortions which are unsuccessful and result 
in the birth of a healthy baby. The courts are unwilling to 
regard the birth of a healthy baby as an injury.64 However, a 
court will provide a remedy to an injured patient if it is shown 
that the physician acted in a negligent manner. 
With respect to educators, the courts have been divided 
about whether injury can be established in education cases. 
The court in Peter W. contended that there was no certainty 
that the plaintiff suffered any injury within the legal definition 
of negligence despite negligent acts by the defendants. And in 
Hunter, the court reiterated that if a tort of educational 
malpractice was recognized, money damages would be a poor 
remedy, thus suggesting that a limitation of damages would be 
appropriate. 
The issue of damages for an injury suffered by a student 
has been determined by a Texas federal district court in a Title 
IX sexual abuse case which held that a school district was 
liable for the sexual abuse of a student perpetrated by a school 
employee under the concept of strict liability.65 The court 
limited damage awards to situations putting money into direct 
services for children. The court found three appropriate 
remedies: 1) the expenses for medical treatment; 2) the 
expenses for mental health treatment; and 3) the expenses for 
special education. These three elements of damage were 
"designed to award money to pay for services that are best able 
64. Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984). However, twenty-two states 
recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth. See Kelly E. Rhinehart, The Debate Over 
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 26 Law & Psycho!. Rev. 141, 142 (2002). 
65. Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Tex. 1995), 
overruled, Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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to heal the child physically, emotionally, and intellectually."66 
The three areas are designed to maximize healing so that the 
child can realize his or her full potential. The damages are 
limited in part because of the court's concern that financially-
strapped school districts would reject critically needed federal 
funds due to potential litigation. "These funds must not be 
rejected because they carry with them the potential of a 
disastrous damage award, no matter how remote the potential 
is."67 Options other than money damages typically assessed in 
medical malpractice would likely also be available in 
educational malpractice cases. 
However, once again, the dissent in Hunter points out the 
feasibility of an action in educational malpractice by stating 
that there can be no question that a negligent educator may 
damage a child. Similarly, Schmoker signaled the significant 
and enduring effect education has on students. He wrote, "A 
report on education and the economy indicates that 
'educational attainment is the single most important 
determinant of a person's success in the labor market. . . . In 
the 50 years it has been tracked, the payoff to schooling has 
never been higher."'68 If there is a payoff for being educated, 
the lack of an education must be a detriment to one's chances 
for success. 
5. Defenses 
If a patient has contributed to his or her injuries or has 
assumed some sort of risk, damages will either not be awarded 
or be reduced. The courts have held that the creation of a 
physician-patient relationship requires that the duty 
established be reciprocal. Thus, the patient is required to use 
the care a person would ordinarily use in similar circumstances 
and, if he or she does not, then the patient cannot hold the 
physician liable for harm. Specifically, a patient is required to 
provide adequate information to the physician, follow the 
instructions given by the physician, and submit to the 
treatment the physician orders. If failure to do so enhances the 
66. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 956. 
67. Id at 955 (The policy argument of the district court was that "the risk of harm 
is better placed on a school district than on a young student."). 
68. Michael Schmoker, Results: The Key to Continuous School Improvement 8 (2d 
ed., Assn. for Supervision & Curriculum Dev. 1999) (citations omitted). 
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injury, the patient will not be able to recover damages for his 
contribution to the injury. 
For example, in an action against a physician for the 
improper diagnosis of appendicitis, the court held the plaintiff 
contributorily negligent for failing to disclose pertinent 
information to the physician and failing to seek further medical 
attention when her condition worsened.69 In another case, a 
patient was determined to be contributorily negligent when her 
physician told her to return in six months after a lump was 
found in her breast and she waited fifteen months, resulting in 
a loss of survival expectancy.70 
Since educational malpractice is not a recognized cause of 
action, the issue of defenses has not been addressed in the case 
law. However, discussion of factors regarding causation, such 
as motivation and home life discussed previously, could be 
raised as a defense since they are external factors beyond the 
control of the educator. The classic defense of contributory 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff would be available in an 
educational malpractice suit as it is in medical malpractice. It 
is clear that a physician will not be held liable for damages if a 
diabetic will not take her insulin even though it was prescribed 
and the ramifications for not taking the medication were 
discussed. This defense could be raised if the student failed to 
follow the instructions of the teacher such as not turning in 
assignments, turning in partially completed assignments, 
failing to pay attention in class. Therefore, a student would 
arguably be required to take reasonable responsibility for his or 
her own learning. 
Patients die and clients go to jail-the outcome of the 
rendering of professional services is not always positive. 
Courts recognize that part of being a professional includes 
making judgment calls that may not always guarantee a 
positive result. Generally, the issue is whether the 
professional rendered the expected service. Following the 
examples from medicine and law, the issue would not be 
whether the student learned, but whether the educator 
rendered the instruction that would be expected of a 
professional educator. 
69. Carreker v. Harper, 396 S.E.2d 587 (Ga. App. 1990). 
70. Roers v. Engebretson, 479 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1992). 
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B. Policy Issues Related to Educational Malpractice 
In addition to legal issues, policy issues also play a critical 
role in the decision not to recognize educational malpractice as 
a cause of action. As stated previously, policy issues can 
completely close off a legal analysis such as when policy 
considerations preclude the recognition of a duty. Currently, 
public policy dictates that educational malpractice not be 
recognized as a tort. But public policy does change. For 
example, only three states (California, Washington, and New 
Jersey) currently recognize the tort of wrongful life, which 
occurs when a plaintiff child alleges that the defendant caused 
his/her existence but not necessarily the impairment. The 
acceptance of a wrongful life tort creates a policy in which 
physicians have a new duty to protect children from existing. 71 
In most jurisdictions, cases alleging wrongful life are dismissed 
for failure to state a claim. 72 While a bar to wrongful life suits 
exists as a policy matter in forty-seven states, that bar was 
lifted in three states and may well be lifted in the others. 73 As 
in a wrongful life suit, policy considerations are ever changing 
and therefore, a look at educational public policy is essential. 
For years, school districts were immune from tort liability, 
regardless of the circumstances surrounding the claim against 
the district. This was based on a common law principle that 
the government could not be sued without its consent. The 
policy reasons that were given for protecting school districts 
were: 1) school districts only have the powers granted by the 
legislature, and, if the legislature did not give the school 
districts the power to be sued, they could not be sued; 2) since 
the public would receive no benefit from allowing successful 
suits, payment of damages from school district funds would be 
an illegal expenditure of public funds; 3) allowing suits would 
open the floodgates and place a financial burden on school 
districts; 4) the concept of respondeat superior that allows an 
employer to be sued for the actions of his or her employees does 
not apply to school districts; and 5) immunity cannot be 
abolished by the judiciary, only by the legislature.74 
71. Rhinehart, supra n. 64, at 152. 
72. Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hasp. Ctr., 473 N.E.2d 244, 246 (N.Y. 1984) 
(plaintiffs failed to allege an injury cognizable at law). 
73. ld. at 245-246 (rejecting plaintiffs public policy argument). 
74. Kern Alexander & M. David Alexander, The Law of Schools, Students, and 
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However, a change m attitude regarding the 
appropriateness of governmental immunity with regard to 
school districts resulted in a change in both policy and law. In 
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, the 
court found that a school district could be held liable in a tort 
action. 75 In this case, a student was injured in a school bus 
accident. In overturning existing policy that granted 
immunity, the court stated that it was almost incredible that 
the concept of governmental immunity could exempt 
governmental entities from liability for their tortious acts, 
which resulted in a burden to an individual. 
Public policy does change with changing times and 
changing needs, interests, and values. While policy 
considerations have served as a bar to educational malpractice 
suits, California, where the first educational malpractice suit 
was argued, may have breached the policy argument by holding 
educators personally liable for their instructional decisions. 
Ill. CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION V. STATE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION 
On June 2, 1998, California voters approved ballot 
Proposition 227 entitled "English Language in Public 
Schools."76 It amended the California Education Code 
Teachers in a Nutshell (West Publg. Co. 1993). 
75. 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959) 
76. For a discussion of Proposition 227, see Thomas F. Felton, Student Author, 
Sink or Swim? The State of Bilingual Education in the Wake of California Proposition 
227, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 843-880 (1998); Amy S. Zabetakis, Student Author, 
Proposition 227: Death for Bilingual Education, 13 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 105-128 (1998); 
Scott Ellis Ferrin, Reasserting Language Rights of Native American Students in the 
Face of Proposition 227 and Other Language-Based Referenda, 28 J. L. & Educ., 1 
(1999); and Joseph A. Santosuosso, Student Author, When in California ... In Defense 
of the Abolishment of Bilingual Education, 33 New Eng. L. Rev. 837-879 (1999). For a 
discussion of Proposition 227 from a research perspective, see Special Issue on the 
Implementation of California's Proposition 227 (1998-2000), Bilingual Research J. 
(2000). 
The preamble to the legislation states in part: 
The People of California find and declare as follows: 
(a) Whereas, the English language is the national public language of the 
United States of America and of the State of California, is spoken by the vast 
majority of California residents, and is also the leading world language for 
science, technology, and international business, thereby being the language 
of economic opportunity; and 
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replacing bilingual programs with immersion programs, in 
which students are required to learn English and other 
subjects by speaking with a teacher who teaches primarily in 
English. 77 The unintended consequences of this initiative may 
have opened the door to educational malpractice m 
California. 78 
Proposition 227 changed the way English Language 
Learners (ELL) are educated in California.79 Bilingual 
education, long a staple in California, was replaced with 
English immersion classes as the automatic placement for 
ELLs unless parents or guardians give informed consent for 
their child to participate in a bilingual problem.80 Unlike 
bilingual classrooms where any mixture of language is 
acceptable, English immersion classrooms require that "nearly 
all classroom instruction [be J in English."81 The Proposition 
sought to ensure that "all children in California public schools 
shall be taught English as rapidly and effectively as possible."82 
In order to accomplish this goal, the Proposition requires 
students "be taught English by being taught in English."83 
Students are guaranteed the right to be provided instruction in 
(b) Whereas, immigrant parents are eager to have their children acquire a 
good knowledge of English, thereby allowing them to fully participate in the 
American Dream of economic and social advancement; and ... 
77. An equal protection claim regarding Proposition 227 was rejected in Valeria v. 
Davis, 307 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002). 
78. For arguments supporting educational malpractice, see Johnny C. Parker, 
Educational Malpractice: A Tort is Born, 39 Clev. St. L. Rev. 301 (1991); Terrence C. 
Collingsworth, Applying Negligence Doctrine to the Teaching Profession, 11 J.L. & 
Educ. 479 (1982); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: 
Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 777 (1985). For the opposite view 
that educational malpractice is not a viable cause of action, see Joan Blackburn, 
Student Author, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue? 7 Fordham Urb. L.J. 
117 (1978); Richard Furnston, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Search of 
a Theory, 18 S.D. L. Rev. 743 (1981); Karin H. Calavenna, Student Author, 
Educational Malpractice, 64 U. Det. L. Rev. 717 (1987). 
79. The term English Language Learner has replaced the former terms of limited-
English and non-English speaker. ELL describes a student whose first language is not 
English and who is beginning to learn English or have some proficiency in English. 
The argument for the use of ELL is that it reframes the problem from a language 
deficiency to a specific educational need. See e.g. Mark W. LaCelle-Peterson & 
Charlene Rivera, Is It Real for All Kids? A Framework for Equitable Assessment 
Policies for English Language Learners, 64 Harv. Educ. Rev. 55 (1994). 
80. Cal. Educ. Code Ann. § 310 (West 2002). 
81. Cal. Educ. Code Ann. § 306(d) (West 2002). 
82. Cal. Educ. Code Ann. § 300(f) (West 2002). 
83. Cal. Educ. Code Ann. § 305 (West 2002) 
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"English language classrooms."84 An English language 
classroom is defined in the statute as one in which the 
instruction given is "overwhelmingly" in English.85 
Because teacher speech is the dominant mode of 
instruction, the requirement to conduct that speech 
overwhelmingly in English impacts the delivery of instruction 
in the classroom. To what extent does this right of the student 
to instruction in English impact the responsibility owed to the 
student? 
Statutory control over the public school curriculum has long 
been accepted as part of the plenary power of the legislative 
branch of state government. The assignment of a statutory 
right to students is also consistent with the long held property 
right of students.86 What is unique about Proposition 227 is 
the cause of action available to students. The statute enacted 
by Proposition 227 reads in pertinent part: 
If a California school child has been denied the option of 
an English language instructional curriculum in public 
school, the child's parent or legal guardian shall have 
legal standing to sue for enforcement of the provisions of 
this statute, and if successful shall be awarded normal 
and customary attorney's fees and actual damages, but 
not punitive damages or consequential damages. Any 
school board member or other elected official or public 
school teacher or administrator who willfully and 
repeatedly refuses to implement the terms of this 
statute by providing such an English language 
educational option at an available public school to a 
California school child may be held personally liable for 
fees and actual damages by the child's parents or legal 
guardian.87 
In other words, educators owe a statutory duty to provide 
students with a standard of practice that "nearly all classroom 
instruction is in English."88 Failure to provide the specified 
standard of instructional care provides a legal cause of action 
to sue for the harm caused by a lack of professional care. As 
asked previously, has the door to educational malpractice, 
84. ld. 
85. Cal. Educ. Code Ann. § 306(b) (West 2002). 
86. See e.g. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
87. Cal. Educ. Code Ann. § 320 (West 2002) (emphasis added). 
88. Cal. Educ. Code Ann. § 306(d) (West 2002). 
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which has been shut for decades, been opened a crack by the 
passage of Proposition 227 and its right to sue? 
Suit was brought in federal district court seeking to enjoin 
enforcement of the proposition in California Teachers 
Association v. Davis. 89 The suit only challenged the provision 
that gives parents a private cause of action against teachers 
and school administrators who violate the law. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the provision in question (section 320) was 
unconstitutional. 90 
A. California Teachers Association v. Davis: The District Court 
The plaintiffs' main contention in California Teachers was 
that Proposition 227 violates protected speech.91 The 
Proposition must therefore comply with the stringent 
vagueness and due process standards. 92 In the alternative, if 
the Proposition does not implicate the First Amendment right 
to free speech, "then the statute's language must be sufficiently 
clear so that it will not chill protected speech."93 
The plaintiffs asserted that they were unsure as to what 
behavior will subject them to liability. They argued that the 
Proposition is not specific enough to allow them to know how 
much use of a foreign language will violate the Proposition. 
One of the teachers expressed concern that Spanish used in 
disciplinary situations and in instructions regarding 
earthquake safety procedures could subject her to liability.94 
Similarly, another plaintiff teacher contended liability could 
result from speaking to another teacher's students in situations 
involving playground supervision and safety.95 A third plaintiff 
teacher claimed that the Proposition would limit her discussion 
of bilingual options with parents. 96 
89. 64 F. Supp. 2d 945 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
90. ld. The plaintiffs were the California Teachers Association, Association of 
Mexican American Educators, California Association for Asian-Pacific Bilingual 
Education, National Association for Bilingual Education, Association of California 
School Administrators, and teachers Irella Perez, Norma Steiner, Kristin Worthman, 
and Emily Palacio. 
91. Id. at 952. 
92. ld. 
93. ld. 
94. Id. at 949 (citing Steiner Decl. , 3). 
95. Id. (citing Perez Decl. ~ 3). 
96. ld. (citing Worthman Decl. ~ 3). 
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Senior District Judge Rafeedie quickly dispatched the 
defendants' Eleventh Amendment assertion of sovereign 
immunity. Next, the judge turned to the plaintiffs' argument 
that the Proposition implicates First Amendment Rights and 
thus must meet the stringent standards of vagueness and due 
process. If the statute implicates free speech, then the 
statute's language "must be sufficiently clear so that it will not 
chill protected speech."97 
What free speech rights, if any, do educators, as employees, 
enjoy in their classrooms? In the instance of teacher speech in 
the classroom, the issue is cast as the relationship of the state 
as employer and not as sovereign. An individual, when acting 
as an employee of the state, has less free speech rights than 
when the individual's relationship is one in which the state is 
sovereign. The court opined that the beginning point of this 
analysis is a balancing test weighing the rights of the teacher 
against the need for the efficient operation of the service 
provided by government. 
The court laid a foundation of two principles upon which to 
build its analysis. First, the court held that a classroom is not 
a public forum; therefore, "school officials may impose 
reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and 
other members of the school community."98 The public school 
classroom is a closed forum because it is reserved for the 
exclusive use of government-the teaching of the adopted 
curriculum. Second, "[t]eachers do not have a First 
Amendment right to determine what curriculum will be taught 
in the classroom."99 This is particularly true when a teacher's 
97. Id. at 952. 
98. Id. at 953 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)). The 
Hazelwood standard of legitimate pedagogical concern was originally applied to 
student speech but has been used in controversies involving teachers' and professors' 
speech as curriculum. For a discussion of the Hazelwood standard as applied to 
educators, see e.g. Todd A. DeMitchell, Miles v. Denver Public Schools: Teacher 
Autonomy, An Endangered Concept?, Inti. J. Educ. Reform 298 (1992). 
99. Cal. Teachers Assn., 64 F.Supp. at 953. Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. 
Dist., 787 F. Supp. 1412 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (prohibiting the teaching of creationism and 
requiring the teaching evolution does not violate the First Amendment); Ward v. 
Hickey, 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993) (prohibiting presentations on abortions did not 
abridge free speech); Boring v. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (in a dispute 
over a play, the Fourth Circuit, in an en bane decision, held that school administrators, 
not teachers, have control over the curriculum); Searcy v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (11th 
Cir. 1989), school administration has a legitimate pedagogical concern in determining 
the school's curriculum. 
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choice of curriculum is in contravention of specific board 
policies. Thus the district court determined that teachers do 
not have a constitutional right to select the curriculum. 
Moving from curriculum where teachers do not enjoy a 
constitutional right to overrule the administrative decisions as 
to what shall be taught, the court next reviewed whether 
teachers have a right to select their instructional methods. 
Borrowing from higher education where professors have a more 
articulated right to academic freedom, the court stated: 
When the University determines the content of the 
education it provides, it is the University speaking, and 
we have permitted the government to regulate the 
content of what is or is not expressed when it is the 
speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its 
own message. 100 
As discussed above, classroom instruction is characterized 
by speech and teachers monopolize that speech. Instruction is 
the curriculum and instruction is, in large measure, teacher 
speech. Therefore, it can be argued that the school board's 
ability to effectively control the curriculum is largely measured 
by its ability to control teacher speech. Referring obliquely to 
established precedent, the district court held that the state can 
regulate in-class speech as long as its decision relates to a 
legitimate pedagogical concern (the Hazelwood standard101) 
and "that teachers do not have a First Amendment right to be 
free of regulations which tell them to follow a method of 
instruction or a curriculum." 102 
The court concluded that the plain language of the statute 
limits the requirements of the statute to teaching and 
instruction. "The Proposition does not completely prohibit 
languages other than English. The Proposition does not 
mention or refer to any prohibition of languages other than 
English used in disciplining students, emergency training, 
social interactions, tutoring, parent-teacher conferences, or any 
of the other situations listed by the Plaintiffs."103 While finding 
that teachers do not have a constitutional right to select their 
instructional methods or their language for instructional 
100. Cal. Teachers Assn., 64 F.Supp. at 953 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of U. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
101. See supra n. 98. 
102. Cal. Teachers Assn., 64 F.Supp. at 954. 
103. Id. 
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purposes, the Proposition only limits their classroom 
instruction, not all interactions with students. 
B. Vagueness 
Another argument advanced by the plaintiffs was the 
contention that the statute was vague because it fails to 
provide adequate notice as to what conduct is prohibited and 
what conduct will potentially expose them to liability. A basic 
principle of due process is violated if a legislative enactment 
does not clearly define its prohibitions. A statute is void for 
vagueness if it fails to give people of ordinary intelligence 
adequate notice of the conduct it proscribes or if it incites 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 104 
The court asserted that the provisions of the Proposition 
are sufficiently clear. The relevant provisions involve only 
classroom instruction, and "teachers do not have significant 
First Amendment rights inside the classroom."105 Therefore, a 
more stringent standard of review is not necessary because of 
the reduced right to free speech. However, even if a more 
stringent analysis were employed because the Proposition 
chills speech outside the classroom, the judge argued that the 
statute would also survive this more stringent vagueness 
analysis. On its face, the statute only pertains to classroom 
instruction. Even if the statute is less clear about the amount 
of English required in the classroom, "it cannot be said to chill 
speech outside the classroom" where it is not applicable. 106 
C. Due Process Challenge 
Central to this discussion is the court's analysis of the 
plaintiffs due process challenge. The plaintiffs contended that 
the Proposition violates due process because 1) it does not 
specify intent to override the common law immunity for 
educational malpractice; 2) it is silent on the standard for 
104. See Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1984). The vagueness 
standard serves three main purposes: (1) to avoid punishing people for behavior they 
could not have known was illegal; (2) to avoid subjective enforcement of laws by 
governmental officers, judges and juries; and (3) to avoid any chilling effect on the 
exercise of First Amendment freedoms. See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-
33 (1963). 
105. Cal. Teachers Assn., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 956. 
106. Id. 
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measuring damages; and 3) it lacks procedural safeguards 
against arbitrary and bad-faith lawsuits. 107 
Addressing these three claims, the district court 
acknowledged that, in regards to educational malpractice, 
under common law "school authorities did not owe students 
any duty of care in the process of their academic education."108 
The plaintiffs advanced the argument that due process is 
violated because the Proposition did not use clear and 
unambiguous terms to effect a significant departure from 
California's common law rule that does not allow a tort for 
educational malpractice. The court found that the question 
was one of state law and not a question of Constitutional due 
process. "Instead, the question of how far the Proposition goes 
in abrogating the common law is a question of statutory 
interpretation, which is a matter of state law not properly 
before the Court."109 Thus, the issue of whether Proposition 
227 has opened the door for educational malpractice was not 
resolved. 
The second claim was that due process was violated because 
no standard was provided for assessing damages. Punitive 
damages are not available under the statute, only a claim for 
actual damages is available. Due process only requires that 
the damages not be awarded arbitrarily-it does not require 
the statute authorizing them to spell out in detail what 
constitutes actual damages. 
The district court judge asserted that the plaintiffs cited no 
support for their third claim that the Proposition must have 
procedural safeguards. "The statute leaves teachers in the 
same position as that of all other potential litigants who are 
free to defend themselves against non-meritorious suits."110 
Teachers and school administrators do not have a right to have 
special safeguards. 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants on all claims. The plaintiffs appealed the 
vagueness challenge only. 
107. Id. at 956-57. 
108. Id. The court referred to Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814. 
109. Cal. Teachers Assn., 64 F.Supp. at 956-57. 
llO. Id. at 957. 
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D. The Appeal111 
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that Proposition 227 
was unconstitutionally vague in two respects. 112 First, they 
asserted that it failed to define clearly when teachers are 
required to speak in English. They argued that the mandate to 
provide an "'English language educational option' is 
unfathomable, leaving them guessing under which 
circumstances the language restrictions of Proposition 227 
apply." 113 Second, they contended that Proposition 227 failed to 
define clearly how much non-English instruction will subject 
them to personal liability. The plaintiffs argued that the terms 
"nearly all" and "overwhelmingly" are imprecise words and fail 
to provide adequate notice. 114 
Acknowledging that the Supreme Court has not squarely 
addressed the issue of what, if any, level of in-class speech by 
teachers should be afforded First Amendment protection, the 
court of appeals assumed arguendo that Proposition 227 covers 
instructional speech and thus receives some First Amendment 
protection. Agreeing with the district court, the appellate court 
found the Hazelwood standard of legitimate pedagogical 
concern to apply. 115 The court allowed the plaintiffs to 
111. Cal. Teachers Assn. v. St. Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2001). 
112. Id. at 1150. The Court of Appeals noted three primary reasons why vague 
statutes are objectionable. "First, they trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. 
Second, they impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to lower level officials for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary 
and discriminatory application. Third, when vague statutes involve sensitive areas of 
First Amendment freedoms, they operate to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms." 
113. Id. at 1146. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 1149. The court identified three different tests used to analyze the free 
speech rights of teachers. Hazelwood, supra. n. 98, is one test. The second is a 
balancing test. The threshold question is whether the speech of an employee is on a 
matter of public concern in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). The next part of the 
matter of public concern analysis for educators balances the interest of the employee 
with the interest of the state in promoting the efficiency of the public service it 
performs through its employees. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). If 
it is determined that the speech is on a matter of public concern in the second step, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that such protected activity was a substantial or motivating 
factor in the adverse employment decision. If steps one and two are established, the 
employer may show that the employment action would have been taken even in the 
absence of the protected conduct. See Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In 
1994, the United States Supreme Court, in a non-education case, modified this 
traditional analysis. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994). Arguably the 
modification occurs in the balancing portion of the first step. According to the High 
Court, deference should be given to the good-faith belief of the employer that the 
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challenge the statute on its face as opposed to as applied 
because of the assumption that, under Hazelwood, Proposition 
227 clearly implicates free speech. This decision to assume 
that under Hazelwood the plaintiffs enjoy some First 
Amendment protection necessitated the application of the more 
stringent heightened scrutiny analysis for vagueness. 116 
The plaintiffs argued that the statute is vague because 
when they are required to speak in English is varied, 
undefined, and inconsistent. The court confined its review to 
the language of instruction. It found that the terms 
"'instruction' and 'curriculum' are words of common 
understanding 'to which no teacher is a stranger.'"117 The court 
acknowledged that there would be situations at the margin 
where it would be unclear whether a teacher is providing 
instruction and presenting the curriculum. However, the 
touchstone of facial vagueness challenges is whether a 
substantial amount of legitimate speech will be chilled, not 
whether some amount will be chilled. 
Furthermore, the court also considered the context in which 
the statute operates. In this instance, the court found that the 
context is curriculum presentation. Under Hazelwood, a 
restriction on teacher speech need only be reasonably related to 
a legitimate pedagogical concern. Normally, First Amendment 
rights "give way to the state's pedagogical interests.'' 118 The 
court found that the state's pedagogical interests are 
"paramount in this context" and the plaintiffs' enjoy only 
minimal First Amendment rights (assuming they enjoy any 
protection at all). Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded 
that Section 320 of Proposition 227 is not unconstitutionally 
vague on its face, affirming the judgment of the district 
court. 119 
employee's speech is disruptive. The third test developed from Rust u. Sullivan, 500 
U.S. 173 (1991) and Rosenberger u. Rectors & Visitors of U. Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) 
when the government is the speaker. When government is the speaker and it conveys 
a particular message through a person, that person receives no First Amendment 
protection. 
116. Cal. Teachers Assn., 271 F.3d at 1150. ("When First Amendment freedoms 
are at stake, courts apply the vagueness analysis more strictly, requiring statutes to 
provide a greater degree of specificity and clarity than would be necessary under 
ordinary due process principles. The reason for this rule is that 'First Amendment 
freedoms need breathing space to survive."') (citations omitted). 
117. Id. at 1151. 
118. Id. at 1154. 
119. Id. at 1155. The majority noted that its holding did not precluded an educator 
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The dissent argued that teachers do not have fair notice of 
when and how much English is required in order to avoid 
personal liability. Enforcement of the statute is left to the 
"whims" of individual parents, which invites ad hoc 
enforcement. The dissent characterized the parental 
enforcement provisiOn of Proposition 227 as "legalistic 
ambush."120 The dissent concluded, citing Ward v. Hickey, a 
First Circuit public school academic freedom case: "If teachers 
must fear retaliation for every utterance, they will fear 
teaching ."121 
IV. FUTURE OF EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE 
To date, educators have not been held legally accountable 
for the professional services they render. Two streams may 
combine to overcome the steadfast objections of the courts to 
recognize educational malpractice as a viable tort for 
negligence. First, the standard of care that educators owe to 
students may be established. Second, a statutory duty has 
been created that may break the wall protecting educators 
from malpractice suits. 
The duty analysis in Peter W. concluded that, as educators, 
we do not have standards of practice that guide our teaching. 
However, most professional associations have defined in 
various terms of vagueness what a teacher should do as a 
demonstration of best practices. David Dill writes of the time 
following Peter W. that "[o]ne distinguishing characteristic of 
the education reform movement of the 1980s is the assumption 
that a knowledge base for the teaching profession now can be 
defined-a knowledge base that can be used in designing 
future teacher education programs."122 Books such as Qualities 
of Effective Teachers, discussing a research-based framework 
for quality teaching, have become commonplace in the 
educationallexicon. 123 And research examining best practices 
form bringing a vagueness challenge on an as-applied basis. 
120. Id. at 1159 (citations omitted). 
121. Id. at 1159-1160 (citing Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
122. David D. Dill & Associates, What Teachers Need To Know: The Knowledge, 
Skills, and Values Essential to Good Teaching xiii (1st ed., Josey-Bass Publishers 
1990). 
123. James H. Stronge, Qualities of Effective Teachers (Assn. for Supervision & 
Curriculum Dev. 2002). 
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in teaching is discussed in books as well as scholarly 
compendiums. 124 
Parker identifies another aspect of how a duty to teach is 
formed. He writes, "[S]ome state legislatures have also created 
Professional Teaching Practices Commissions that are 
responsible for developing through the teaching profession, 
criteria of professional practice, including ethical and 
professional performance."125 Arguably, there is a body of 
professional knowledge gained through research and collective 
professional wisdom that is accepted by the various 
professional organizations defining what instructional duty is 
owed to students. 
To date, educators have not been held legally responsible 
like other professionals for services rendered to the public. 
Proposition 227 may have altered that landscape by providing 
a statutory duty owed to students, thus overcoming the 
rationale of Peter W. Educators, like other professionals, could 
be subject to malpractice liability when their professional 
conduct-instructional practice or speech-falls below an 
accepted level and causes harm. Proposition 227, which grants 
a right of individual recovery for violations of a statutorily 
defined duty, may well have overcome the policy argument 
used in Peter W. 
Accountability measures are sweeping the nation. A policy 
of educational malpractice grounded in accountability and 
supported by the right of private recovery of Proposition 227 
may reverse the history of court aversion to the tort. 
124. See M.L. Wittrock, Handbook of Research on Teaching (3d ed., 1986). 
125. Johnny C. Parker, Educational Malpractice: A Tort is Born, 39 Clev. St. L. 
Rev. 301,317-318 (1991). 
